THEMES

The Southern European model of immigration: do the cases of Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia fit?

RUSSELL KING and MARK THOMSON

Introduction

The 2004 enlargement of the European Union brought in 10 new member states: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. Echoing concerns which had arisen over the EU’s southern enlargement in the 1980s when northern countries such as Germany and the UK feared the influx of Greek, Spanish and Portuguese migrants, the 2004 enlargement was accompanied by a political and media focus on the potential scale of westward migration from Central and Eastern Europe. As it turned out, fears about large-scale northwards migration from the 1980s enlargement proved largely groundless, partly because free movement from these Southern EU countries was subject to a transition period, but mainly because emigration from Greece, Spain and Portugal had already run its course by the 1980s.

The situation regarding the 2004 enlargement was more complicated. Only three EU countries, Sweden, the UK and Ireland, opened their labour markets to free movement; the remaining countries imposed a seven-year transition period. Three of the ‘new’ EU states, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus, were granted freedom of movement, since it was thought that the migration potential from these small and relatively prosperous countries would be extremely limited. On the other hand, the UK and Ireland, particularly, were surprised at the scale of immigration which emanated from so-called A8 (Central and East European) countries. By late 2006, a little over two years after enlargement, the UK registered approximately 600,000 newcomers from these countries, the majority from Poland.1 The unexpectedly large size of this inflow was one of the main factors which led the UK government not to open the doors to migrants from the two latest accession countries, Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU on 1 January 2007.2

The above remarks set some context for this paper. The almost-obsessive focus on East–West migration resulting from the 2004 enlargement had the effect of diverting attention away from the three new southern members, Slovenia,

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1The figure of 600,000 referred only to arrivals and took no account of returns. This is a major statistical oversight, and greatly distorted the public debate over this issue.
2Except for small quotas of highly skilled workers and seasonal farm workers.
Malta and Cyprus, and in particular the very different migration dynamics unfolding there. Like other Southern EU member countries (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal), Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus now have levels of prosperity which are quite close to the EU average, and they have become destinations for immigration in recent years. In each of the three, immigration has become a hotly debated issue, yet these discussions are hardly heard outside their borders. Moreover, the issue has wider significance, because of these countries’ geographical positions on the southern ‘front line’ of the EU and their function as migration stepping-stones on key routes from the Balkans (Slovenia), North Africa (Malta) and the eastern Mediterranean (Cyprus).

The broad aim of this paper is to present data and insights on recent migration trends in Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus, but this is done within a particular theoretical setting. This framing context is the notion of a regionally and historically specific Southern European model of immigration. This model highlights the rapid transformation of Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain from countries of mass emigration up to the 1970s to countries of large-scale immigration since then, and especially since 1990. Its distinctiveness lies in the specific socio-economic and demographic characteristics and changes in these countries which have created both needs and opportunities for immigrant workers. Key features of the model are presented in more detail in the next section of the paper. Subsequently, we will outline the main research questions which underpin our analysis, followed by a brief note on methods used to gather relevant information. We then examine the EU context of Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus, aided by some comparative economic and social statistics. This sets the scene for a country-by-country commentary on migration trends and reactions to migration. Our conclusion draws out general themes and reflects the findings back to the research questions posed and to the heuristic function of the ‘South European model’.

The Southern European migration model

Our deployment of the term ‘Southern European model of immigration’ refers to a common set of migratory characteristics and explanatory factors which have generated more-or-less parallel migratory trends in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal over the past 50 years. For each, the historical profile divides into three phases: large-scale emigration between the 1950s and the early 1970s, followed by a period of return migration and approximate migratory balance during the 1970s, succeeded by growing and largely unregulated immigration during the 1980s and, especially, the 1990s and early 2000s.

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4 Research for this paper was funded by the Nuffield Foundation Social Sciences Small Grants Scheme (grant No. SGS/01207/G), held during May–October 2005, which we gratefully acknowledge.
An immediate contrast can be noted with the earlier post-war labour migrations into Northern Europe: these were state-regulated, less diverse in terms of migrants’ geographical origins, and mainly undertaken by poorly educated, low-skill rural migrants. Southern European and other Mediterranean-basin countries were the main sources. In most receiving countries, just a few migrant nationalities contributed the majority of these post-war migrants. The vast majority of these migrations were legal, governed by bilateral recruitment treaties and quotas. Nearly all migrants were destined for the major cities and industrial conurbations where they worked in a range of low-skilled but hard-labour jobs in construction, mines and factories. Initially viewed as temporary ‘guestworkers’, many of these mainly male labour migrants settled down, bringing over or forming families in the destination countries. Integration has been far from easy, but these migrant-origin populations now form stable components of Northern Europe’s pluri-ethnic and arguably multicultural urban societies.

Post-1980s immigration into the Southern European countries of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal was characterized by different features to the ‘North European model’ briefly outlined above. Before we list these features, let us first examine the range of explanatory factors which triggered the ‘new immigrations’.

An initial set of causal mechanisms are essentially geographical. These have to do, firstly, with a ‘diversion effect’: as the barriers went up for legal entry of new labour migrants into the Northern European countries from 1973 on, would-be immigrants entered Southern European countries, where border controls were lax, as an alternative option. The geographical location of Southern Europe, on existing south–north migration routes linking the southern Mediterranean with Northern Europe, facilitated this option. After 1990, the strategic location of Southern Europe, lying astride both the North–South ‘demographic and development gap’ separating Europe from Africa, and the East–West frontier, which abuts Italy and Greece, became even more crucial to evolving patterns of immigration flow.

A second set of explanatory factors concerns the specific socio-economic and demographic changes which have created the demand for ever-larger numbers of migrant workers in Southern Europe. Falling birth rates since the 1960s and rising educational standards since the 1970s mean that employers can no longer rely on the internal migration of mainly unskilled and poorly educated rural labour to fill vacancies, as they could in the 1950s and 1960s, when rural–urban migration was at its peak. Meanwhile, economic restructuring and development in the region—notably in the fields of specialized agriculture, construction, tourism, small-scale industry, and personal and care services—has created a need...
for immigrant workers to fill ‘holes’ in particular labour-market niches, in both the formal and informal sectors of the economy.

This rather profound socio-economic transformation of the four countries—which took them from mass emigration to mass immigration—corresponded to a rapid jump in their levels of human development and personal disposable income, resulting in a marked narrowing of the development gap between Northern and Southern Europe. For three of the countries, EU accession undoubtedly boosted development dynamics, whilst Italy had been for some time pursuing a twin-track development path with efficient, small and medium industrial complexes in the North-Centre, and state and EU-assisted development in the South. But even more important is the relationship between immigration trends and the specific nature of Southern Europe economic development. Enzo Mingione argues that Southern Europe constitutes a special case of European capitalist evolution, characterized by late and restricted industrialization, large agricultural and tourist sectors, speculative urban development and an extensive family-based informal economy. The tertiarization of the economy and the seasonal nature of the region’s productive structures bring about a demand for flexible labour. In the past this fluid labour was supplied by underemployed and mobile rural workers, including women; now immigrants, including many who have entered illegally or arrived legally and overstayed, provide this flexible labour power.

With this explanatory background in mind, we now list the features of the Southern European migration model.

- **First**, there is a *multiplicity of migrant nationalities*. Italy and Spain are the archetypes here, with many immigrant communities from many world regions. Taking the Italian case, the three largest national groups, Moroccans, Albanians and Romanians, make up only a tenth each of the total number of immigrants. There are, in addition, substantial communities from China, the Philippines, India, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Egypt, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Peru, Ecuador, Poland and Ukraine. Rather different is the case of Greece, where two-thirds of the immigrants are from one country, Albania. Also not to be forgotten, in all Southern European countries, are significant communities of Northern Europeans—especially British, Germans and Scandinavians—who have settled, often on retirement, in coastal and attractive rural areas.

- **This leads to the second feature—heterogeneity of migrant types**. North European retirees tend to be fairly well-off, but migrants from poorer countries comprise

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10Data on immigrant permit-holders in Italy for 31 December 2003 show, out of a total stock of just under 2.2 million: Romania 239,426 (10.9 per cent), Albania 233,616 (10.6 per cent), Morocco 227,940 (10.4 per cent). From Caritas, ‘Immigrazione Dossier Statistico 2004’, IDOS, Rome, 2004.

a wide range of socio-economic origins, rural and urban, educated and illiterate, poor and not-so-poor.

- Third, there is marked gender specificity and asymmetry. In some immigrant groups there is a marked preponderance of males (e.g. Bangladeshis, Senegalese); in others females are the clear majority (e.g. Filipinos, Ecuadorians).

- Fourth, there is a high level of ‘clandestinity’ and ‘illegality’ involved in these migration flows. They involve, at least initially, mainly undocumented migrants. This situation is, however, partly a function of ineffective or inefficient migration control and management systems. In all four countries, periodic regularization schemes enable ‘irregular’ migrants to become documented and legalized, at least for a period of time.\(^\text{12}\)

- Fifth, there are high levels of spontaneity (so that migration inflows may be sudden and opportunistic), mobility (migrants are highly mobile within destination countries, or move on to another country) and temporariness (both in terms of length of stay in a particular country and in a particular job). These characteristics reflect the irregular, informal nature of the migration process, and the links the migrants have to employment opportunities within a flexible, seasonal and casualized labour market.

- Finally, there are close links with a specific set of labour-market niches, many of which are also racialized and gendered in terms of the immigrants who fill them. The care sector contains a number of subniches—domestic cleaning, baby-sitting, care of elderly or sick people—which are filled almost entirely by female migrants from Catholic countries including the Philippines, Poland, Peru, Cape Verde, etc. Bangladeshi and Senegalese males are heavily involved in street-hawking and petty trading. Agricultural and construction workers are mainly immigrant males originating from many countries, especially those in Eastern Europe and Africa north and south of the Sahara. Sex work, too, is highly gendered (manifestly so) and racialized.\(^\text{13}\)

**Key questions**

Using the Southern European migration model as a kind of template, the rest of this paper investigates the extent to which this framework can be applied to the cases of Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. We ask six questions:

- Is the historical pattern of emigration followed by immigration, structured around the turning-point of the 1970s, which has been the broad pattern for Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain, also to be observed in the three countries under review?

\(^{12}\)Regularizations have been held as follows (figures in parentheses indicate numbers applying or regularized at each scheme). Italy: 1986 (113,000), 1990 (235,000), 1995 (259,000), 1998 (251,000), 2002 (704,000). Spain: 1985 (43,000), 1991 (110,000), 1996 (21,300), 2000 (164,000), 2001 (216,000). Portugal: 1992 (39,000), 1996 (35,000), 2002 (146,000). Greece: 1998 (371,000), 2001 (351,000). Figures culled from various sources, including national statistical websites.

Which nationalities, and in what numbers, are immigrating? Are there similarities to the Italian ‘submodel’ (many immigrant nationalities, no one nationality dominant) or to the Greek submodel (one nationality dominant)?

A key feature of the Southern European model is the high level of clandestine flows, followed by periodic regularizations. Do recent immigrants in the three countries under study suffer from analogous problems of being undocumented, and what measures are taken to regularize their status?

Does immigration into the three countries reflect the same changing socio-economic and labour-market transformations as have occurred in the Southern EU countries? Can we observe a dual labour market whereby immigrant workers mainly fulfil roles which indigenous Slovenes, Maltese and Cypriots are no longer willing to perform?

Are there gender-specific flows, as elsewhere in Southern Europe, which see predominantly male migrants from one set of countries working in agriculture, construction and industry, and females from another set of national origins working in domestic and care jobs?

Finally, do debates on migration policy, integration, racism and xenophobia reflect the way these issues express themselves in the longer-established and larger Southern EU members? In other words, to what extent does a broader social model of immigration extend across the two sets of countries?

We feel that these questions, and our focus on Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus, are amply justified for three principal reasons. Firstly, in contrast with their well-documented histories of emigration, very little research has been undertaken on immigration trends into these three countries. Yet we are aware that ‘new’ immigration is now an established phenomenon with growing economic, social and political salience. Secondly, their recent accession to the EU has the potential to reconfigure the direction and nature of migration patterns and influence EU-wide policy responses, especially in reflection of their geopolitical position on the southern and south-eastern flank of the expanded EU. Thirdly, related to issues of social exclusion, research needs to identify whether racism and prejudice towards newly arrived migrants undermine attempts at integration and community development. We highlight this last concern in light of previous research findings from other Southern European countries where racial discrimination against some migrants risks becoming a permanent feature of society.14

Methods

Research took two main forms. First, a desk study trawled all available published and Internet material on immigration into Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. This approach both preceded the fieldwork, providing a solid information base on which to conduct interviews, and continued after the field trips, in order to update source material since the country visits. Second, a series of visits was

made to the three countries; these took place during the second half of 2005. On these visits, qualitative data was collected through meetings and interviews with key informants: an average of 10 interviews per country took place. Interviewees included academics, government representatives, policy makers, NGO representatives and activists working on migration issues.\textsuperscript{15} We used a semi-structured interview format to explore deeper and potentially alternative understandings of current migration trends. We also used the on-site visits to source other statistical data not available to us during the first phase of UK-based desk research.

Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus in the EU context

This part of the paper places Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus in the wider comparative context of different sets of European countries. Our aim is to demonstrate broad socio-economic similarity with the pre-existing Southern EU member states, and hence prima facie evidence for the three countries to be considered as part of the Southern European pattern of economic development proposed by Mingione.

Table 1 presents some socio-economic data, with the three countries set against four groups of comparator countries: the four Southern EU countries which were already member states prior to 2004; a sample of three Northern EU countries (France, Belgium and Sweden); a sample of East European countries which joined in 2004 (Poland, Latvia and Hungary); and the two countries which joined in 2007. Aside from population, two main socio-economic indicators are presented: per capita GDP and the Human Development Index (HDI), which combines GDP, life expectancy and education.

The data show some support for the hypothesis that the three ‘new’ Mediterranean EU countries are closer in socio-economic performance to the ‘old’ Southern EU countries than they are to any of the other country groups. Particularly in terms of GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) (the most meaningful GDP measure), the figures for Slovenia (19,150), Malta (17,633) and Cyprus (18,776) are remarkably close to those for Greece (19,954) and Portugal (18,126), although still somewhat below those for Spain (22,391) and, especially, Italy (27,119). The sample of Northern EU countries have PPP figures which are close to the Italian figure, whilst the three A8 countries have figures which are considerably lower, and Bulgaria and Romania are much lower again.

Scores on the HDI are, by their nature as composites, rather more bunched. However, once again we can note clear patterns which support our argument. First, as with the GDP data, there is a close similarity amongst the three countries at the top of the table, although they had become slightly more differentiated in 2003 compared to 1995 (Slovenia leads, Malta lags). Second, and more importantly, the three countries are seen to be close to the Southern EU countries, and once again close to Greece and Portugal (Cyprus’ HDI for 2004 is virtually identical to that of Portugal). The relative positions of the other three comparator sets on Table 1 replicate the situation on the GDP performance:

\textsuperscript{15}We cannot name all interviewees, but we would particularly like to thank Godfrey Baldacchino, Josie Christodoulou, Anton Gosar, Felicita Medved and Sharon Spiteri for their special insights and help in setting up further interviews.
### Table 1. Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus: socio-economic development in comparison with reference-group countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>Per capita GDP 2003</th>
<th>Human Development Index</th>
<th>Average Total Fertility Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>13,909</td>
<td>19,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>12,157</td>
<td>17,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>14,786</td>
<td>18,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>25,471</td>
<td>27,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>15,608</td>
<td>19,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>20,404</td>
<td>22,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>14,161</td>
<td>18,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>29,410</td>
<td>27,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>29,096</td>
<td>28,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>33,676</td>
<td>26,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>5487</td>
<td>11,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4771</td>
<td>10,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>8169</td>
<td>14,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2539</td>
<td>7731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>2619</td>
<td>7277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

(a) GDP at PPP involves an adjustment to take into account the ‘real’ purchasing power of the US dollar in different countries according to their cost of living.

(b) Human Development Index is, in the words of the UNDP which compiles the annual Human Development Reports, an amalgam of the following indicators: a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in PPP US dollars.

(c) Total Fertility Rate represents the average number of children produced by women during their reproductive life cycle.

France etc. being higher than both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Southern EU groups, Poland etc. being somewhat lower, and Bulgaria and Romania much lower, although it is worth noting that the former Warsaw Pact countries have a better HDI than GDP profile, due to their attention to providing health and education for all on an equal basis during communism.

All in all, the data in Table 1 reinforce our argument that the economies and levels of living of Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus are on a par with those of the already-existing Southern EU countries. The statistics also show an element of ‘catching up’ over the past 10–20 years, in much the same way that, during an earlier era (1960s–1980s), Southern Europe (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal) caught up, but did not quite reach, the levels of economic well-being of the Northern EU countries.

Table 2 explores the changing employment structure of the three countries under investigation, compared to the four pre-existing Southern EU states. Once again, common patterns both within and across the two groups are revealed, although gaps in the data for earlier years for Slovenia and Malta somewhat limit the analysis. The figures show initially high but rapidly diminishing shares of the active population employed in agriculture and other primary activities (forestry and fishing), slowly declining shares in industrial employment, and a fast-expanding share employed in services—over 60 per cent in all countries except Slovenia and Portugal. Self-employment accounts for between one-fifth and one-third of the active population in all countries except Spain, where it is marginally lower, and Slovenia, where it is only 11 per cent; this latter figure may be interpreted as a legacy of the country’s history as part of Yugoslavia.

This history also influences Slovenia’s past and recent patterns of migration, as we will see in the first of the next three sections, in which we examine the migration profiles of each of the three countries in turn.

Slovenia

The statistical record of migration in and out of Slovenia is complicated by the country’s recent history as part of the former Yugoslavia. Prior to independence in 1991, Slovene migratory history had, to a large extent, paralleled that of other Southern and South-East European countries: an overseas emigration, particularly to North America, dating back to the late 19th century and continuing, with waves and troughs, up to the early post-war decades, when Australia also became a popular destination; and a ‘guestworker’ emigration, primarily to Germany and Austria, during the 1960s and 1970s.

The relative scale of emigration, according to one scholar, places Slovenia amongst the top-ranked European countries. High rates of emigration sustained over long periods of time have meant that the Slovene population has grown only slowly—from 1.1 million in 1857 to just under 2 million in 2002.

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17By comparison, Croatia and Serbia, which had roughly equal-sized populations to Slovenia in the 19th century, today have populations which are, respectively, twice and five times that of Slovenia. Emigration is not the whole story here; differential birth rates also play a key role. Currently Slovenia
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Self-employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) Data for Cyprus refer to ‘government controlled’ areas, that is, the Greek sector. 
(b) Slovenia: data are for 1995 and 2000. 
According to estimates quoted by Zupančič, the current Slovene diaspora approximates half a million, including 300,000 in the USA, 50,000 in Germany, 30,000 in Canada and 25,000 in Australia. Substantial numbers of Slovenes and people of Slovene descent also live in Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, Serbia, Austria, Italy, France and Sweden. Temporary emigration, measured only in the 1991 census, recorded 53,000 zdomci (guestworkers) in Austria, Germany, Switzerland and Italy.\(^{18}\)

For a time, between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, Slovenia was both an emigration country (chiefly to North America, Australia, Germany and Austria) and an immigration one (from other parts of Yugoslavia—although until 1991 this was technically internal migration). The latter migration was motivated by the search for better jobs and incomes, and reflected higher levels of industrial growth and general prosperity in Slovenia compared to the other Yugoslav republics. Some of this movement could be regarded as ‘replacement migration’ for the Slovenes who had emigrated to work abroad. Table 3 shows that intra-Yugoslavia net migration to Slovenia was positive throughout the period 1955–89. The mid and late 1970s were the peak years, when Bosnians, Croats and Serbs sought jobs in Slovenia due to the end of the European guestworker schemes following the oil crisis in 1973–74. Throughout the period covered by Table 3, most immigrants worked in industry, construction and the health sector, and were aged 20–35 on arrival.\(^{19}\)

One important side effect of Slovenian independence in 1991 was to transform these intra-Yugoslavian migrants into ‘foreigners’ overnight and to deprive them of their legal status in Slovenia. Some 18,000—known as ‘the erased’—were unlawfully removed from Slovenia’s register of permanent residents in February 1992. The background to this unfortunate situation, in brief, is as follows. Under the new Slovenian constitution permanent residents from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia were given the option of applying for Slovenian citizenship. A significant proportion did not exercise this choice for a variety of reasons (ethno-nationalistic pride, intention to return home, etc.), or were refused. They subsequently lost their rights as permanent residents, including their right to work, to have a pension, and to access education and healthcare. The issue remains unresolved, in particular the question of compensation, although subsequent legal amendments have enabled some of the ‘erased’ to acquire Slovenian citizenship and/or permanent residency.\(^{20}\)

Footnote 17 continued

has one of the lowest birth rates in Europe and for the past decade has been negative (i.e. deaths exceed births). Continued population growth (from 1,913,355 at the 1991 census to 1,964,036 in the 2002 census) is thus due to immigration.

\(^{18}\)J. Zupančič, ‘Ethnic structure of Slovenia and Slovenes in neighbouring countries’, in M. O. Adamic (ed.), Slovenia: A Geographical Overview: Association of the Geographical Societies of Slovenia, Ljubljana, 2004, pp. 87–92. These figures do not include members of the long-established Slovene minorities in neighbouring territories. According to Slovene estimates, the Slovene minority is between 83,000 and 100,000 in Italy, 45,000 in Austria and 5000 in Hungary; host-country estimates are invariably much lower (52,000 in Italy, for instance).


\(^{20}\)This paragraph draws on S. Andreev, ‘Making Slovenian citizens: the problem of the Former Yugoslav citizens and asylum-seekers living in Slovenia’, Southeast European Politics, 4(1), 2003,
The 1990s were a turbulent period of migration into Slovenia, above all because of the consequences of the break-up of Yugoslavia. Temporary refugees arrived in the early 1990s, first from neighbouring Croatia and then from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as people fled war and ethnic cleansing. The late 1990s witnessed the arrival of Kosovan refugees in Slovenia following the outbreak of conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. A further ‘migration crisis’ occurred in 2000–2001 with the arrival of a wave of asylum-seekers and so-called illegal immigrants.

The 2002 census recorded 127,502 people who had immigrated from other parts of Yugoslavia—38,964 Serbs, 35,642 Croats, 21,542 Bosnian Serbs, 10,467 Bosnian Muslims, 8062 Bosnian Croats, 6186 Albanians (mainly from Kosovo), 3972 Macedonians and 2667 Montenegrins. In addition there were, according to the census, 6243 Hungarians, 3246 Roma and 2258 Italians; these three groups have special minority status and rights guaranteed by Slovenia’s constitution. However, the methodology used by the 2002 census meant that the ethnicity of some 200,000 people was not recorded, either because it was unknown or because people refused to declare it. Hence, substantial under-enumeration has occurred. Other estimates for some of these ethnic and/or migrant populations give 50,000 Croatians, 45,000 Serbs, 40,000 Bosnian Muslims, 10,000 Hungarians and 10,000 Roma.21 In the last few years immigrants from other countries (China, India, etc.) have also begun to increase although they remain very small communities compared to the above. The attractiveness of the Slovenian landscape and climate has drawn a growing interest amongst foreign property-buyers from Northern Europe, some of whom have settled. However, compared to the other Southern European countries (including Malta and Cyprus), the scale of this influx is modest.

The political reaction to immigration in Slovenia is framed within the upsurge of violent nationalism which was both a cause of, and exacerbated by, the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. The collapse of the communist federal system resulted in new ways of establishing power structures; political power was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Emigration</th>
<th>Net migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955–59</td>
<td>6842</td>
<td>5251</td>
<td>1591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960–64</td>
<td>7410</td>
<td>4255</td>
<td>3155</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965–69</td>
<td>8348</td>
<td>4374</td>
<td>3974</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970–74</td>
<td>7387</td>
<td>3932</td>
<td>3455</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975–79</td>
<td>12,166</td>
<td>4439</td>
<td>7727</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980–84</td>
<td>10,290</td>
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<td>4385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985–89</td>
<td>7930</td>
<td>4279</td>
<td>3651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Footnote 20 continued

21J. Zupančič, op. cit., p. 89.
acquired by an appeal to ethnic identities which were legitimized on the basis of resurrecting ‘muted memories’ of inter-ethnic antagonism; the communist ethos of brotherhood and unity was overturned by attributing problems to groups which had, in the recent past, been neighbours and comrades. A new fragmented Balkan world was created around ‘us’ and ‘them’. Although Slovenia, quick off the mark in gaining international recognition for its independence, avoided the inter-communal violence which devastated other parts of the former Yugoslavia, the country was nevertheless keen to build a national identity which emphasized its ‘northern’, ‘developed’, ‘European’ credentials as against the less-developed and conflict-ridden territories to the south-east.  

Karmen Erjavec argues that, although Slovenia escaped war with its neighbours, the country nevertheless built its ethno-nationalist identity on a raft of antagonism towards ‘others’ who were constituted as dangerous and inferior. This was done through the creation of a series of ‘moral panics’ manufactured by politicians and the media during the first decade of independence. Three episodes stand out, each associated with a migration event that was constructed as an ‘invasion’ of ‘outsiders’ who were ‘different’ and who therefore should be ‘rejected’.

The first two moral panics occurred in spring 1992 and spring 1999; the arrivals of Bosnian and then Kosovan refugees were framed as threats to national security which could only be solved when the border was closed and restrictions on refugee movements tightened. Although the initial public response was quite welcoming to refugees, local reaction to refugee holding centres was often negative, and the xenophobia was widened by the Ministry of the Interior which used ‘pseudo-events’ to notify the media about ‘what really happened’.

The third—and biggest—moral panic focused around the wave of arrivals of migrants and asylum-seekers during the winter of 2000–2001. Starting in early September, the Slovene media began to publish news items about the numbers of people caught crossing the borders with Croatia and Hungary. The news stories had been fed to them by the Slovene police who issued press statements about the upsurge in numbers of ‘illegal immigrants’ from beyond the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia who were said to be abusing their claimed status as asylum-seekers, and who were portrayed as criminals, violent people and carriers of infectious diseases. The usual metaphors of ‘threat’, ‘flood’ and ‘invasion’ were used in both the police and newspaper reports. The police demanded a change in the law on asylum-seekers in Slovenia, which they thought was too generous and was being widely abused, and requested that pressure be put on the governments of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Hungary to guard their borders according to ‘European’ standards, invoking the ‘authority’ of the EU in these requests.

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The Asylum Law was changed in late December 2000, under the justification of the need to improve national security. Asylum-seekers’ freedom of movement was restricted and many wound up in the Centre for Foreigners, located in a working-class neighbourhood of Ljubljana.26 After local protests—which replayed familiar refrains about the inmates’ dirty habits and criminal nature—the refugees were moved to other centres close to the Hungarian and Croatian borders. Further protests occurred in these localities. Then, after civil-society groups organized an anti-xenophobia demonstration in the centre of Ljubljana, as well as other events drawing attention to the plight of the asylum-seekers and migrants, the media switched away from the demonization of immigrants. By February 2001, reports on ‘illegal immigrants’ had virtually disappeared from newspapers and TV screens.

As Slovenia edged closer to EU membership, so the EU backdrop took a more prominent role in policy and actions, above all ensuring that the southern border with Croatia was tightened. This reflected EU, and particularly Italian, concerns that Slovenia was functioning as a major transit country into Europe. Readmission agreements were set up with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to return irregular migrants found to have passed through these countries en route to Slovenia. A further move to a more restrictionist stance was made in early 2006 when, against the background of the European drive towards a common asylum policy and the general global concern about terrorist attacks, Slovenia introduced an initial police check on asylum-seekers. Permitting the police to decide on the validity of an asylum claim reflects the security framing of asylum and is in breach of UNHCR guidelines, since it leaves asylum-seekers more vulnerable to repatriation or deportation to countries where their lives are likely to be more at risk.27

Who are the migrants in Slovenia and what do they do? It is evident that there have been two main migration flows into Slovenia: from the Balkans in the 1990s, adding to earlier migrations from the same sources during the Yugoslav Republic era; and from further afield during the 2000s, including many presenting asylum claims, legitimately or otherwise. The surge in asylum-seekers is documented in Table 4; the majority were from Iran who arrived via Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a visa was not required for them (now it is), and then entered Slovenia illegally via Croatia. The effect of the restrictions on asylum-seekers is clearly evident after 2001, when the numbers dramatically contract. But the telling figure is that, of the 12,470 claims lodged during 1997–2002, only 41 were granted refugee status.28

Responses to the two flows differ for reasons which are familiar to those who study migration and its impact on host populations: the perceived and actual legitimacy of claims for asylum and humanitarian protection; the nature of migrants’ ties with Slovenia; and migrants’ nationality and race. Slovenia’s 70-year history as part of Yugoslavia obviously created much stronger ties with migrants from Bosnia, Croatia, etc. than with those coming from the Middle East.

26 For a detailed, and at times both shocking and moving, study of life inside this, and other such centres in Slovenia see M. Pajnik, P. Lesjak-Tušek and M. Gregorcic, Immigrants, Who are You? Research on Immigrants in Slovenia, Mirovni Institut, Ljubljana, 2001.
28 S. Zavratnik Zimic, op. cit., pp. 27–28. Recent figures from the UNHCR database record only 142 asylum claims granted out of more than 16,000 applications, and only 124 refugees actually living in Slovenia (as of 31 December 2005). See <www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home>.
and Asia, who have been more numerous since 2000. The census data for 2002 reveal the difference in scale between the two groups of migrants: those from the Balkans exceed 127,000; those from other countries, a few hundred at most. In so far as Slovenia acknowledges itself to be an immigrant country, there is an implicit understanding that this refers to European/Balkan immigrants, not to others from further east or south, who are assumed to be merely using Slovenia to trans-migrate to Italy or other Western countries. This assumed dichotomy is only true in part. Studies on human trafficking have revealed how Slovenia functions as an East–West conduit for European sex-work migrants from Russia, the Ukraine and Romania. Where Asian migrants have settled, as with the small but significant Chinese community who work in restaurants in the main towns, there is a suspicion that their businesses are fronts for other, less legal, activities.

Policy-wise, Slovenia has copied, or has been constrained to adopt, the standard EU framework, and especially its southern variant which favours control of borders and exclusion over integration measures. However, even a more positive or proactive policy on migrant integration in Slovenia (as elsewhere) comes up against the fundamental philosophical problem with integration, namely, that it is at base a hegemonic process based on legitimizing the superiority of the values and norms of the host society and of the nation-state. It leaves untouched the mythical ‘canons of Slovenianness’, an imagined national identity that is assumed a priori and never questioned.

Post-accession, new migrant hierarchies are likely to emerge. Ongoing labour shortages are likely to persist in construction, agriculture and the tourist industry, due to low birth rates, an ageing population and rising educational standards amongst Slovenes; lack of internal mobility within Slovenia, where people are often reluctant to sell privatized family homes and give up their

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Serbia-Montenegro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9244</td>
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<td>447</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>272</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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29See the data from the Slovenian Statistical Yearbook 2005 quoted in M. Thomson, op. cit., Appendix, Table 5; see also S. Zavratnik Zimic, op. cit., p. 15, Table 3 and p. 17, Tables 6 and 7.
generations-long attachment to a particular locality, exacerbates these shortages. Croatian and Bosnian workers are nowadays less willing to accept low-paid and tough temporary work in agriculture, but are still employed in construction, where wages are higher. Meanwhile Moldovan workers have been recruited for seasonal work in agriculture in recent years, and the 2004 enlargement has seen a new intra-A8 flow develop between Slovakia and Slovenia—by March 2005 over 1000 Slovaks had found employment in Slovenia, 70 per cent of them in construction. For the future, Croatia is amongst the next countries likely to join the EU, possibly followed at a later date by other Balkan states; this will contribute a new phase to the changing migration dynamics of the region.

Malta

As a much smaller, ethnically homogenous island-state with a stable political history, Malta’s migration trends are simpler to outline than Slovenia’s. Like Cyprus (and the much smaller Gibraltar), its emigration has been shaped by its British colonial status and by its location within the imperial space of British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. Its self-identity as a country of emigration—almost entirely to four anglophone countries—sits uneasily with its much more recent status as a place of immigration, particularly given its geographical character as a small and densely populated island.

Like the rest of Southern Europe, Malta has a long history of emigration. Substantial emigration took place during the 19th century, but the most massive outflow occurred in the post-war decades, from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. High rates of natural population increase have been a fundamental causal factor; despite emigration, the population has grown from 123,500 in 1851 to around 400,000 today. The island is noted for its large families. According to the 1948 census, a quarter of completed families had 10 or more children; average family size was still six children in the 1960s. Since then, the birth rate has fallen sharply towards ‘European’ norms, although it remains above most other Southern European countries such as Italy or Slovenia, which now have very low sub-replacement fertilities (see Table 1).

During the so-called ‘Great Exodus’ of 1946–74, there was a total emigration of 138,000, equivalent to 44 per cent of the Maltese population during this period. Four countries absorbed virtually all of the post-war emigration: Australia (58 per cent), the UK (22 per cent), Canada (13 per cent) and the USA (7 per cent). Emigration, particularly to Australia, the dominant outlet, peaked in the early 1950s and again in the early 1960s. During the single years of 1954

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33Annual data show sharp increases in temporary residence permits awarded to Ukrainians, Russians, Moldovans, Romanians and Chinese after 2000.
35Owing to the scale of emigration, which neutralized the high natural increase (excess of births over deaths), the population total remained rather stable over these years: census figures were 305,991 (1948), 319,668 (1957) and 317,026 (1967). The fall-off of emigration and the growth of return after 1974 then led to renewed rising population. However, natural increase slowed dramatically, so the overall population increase was rather modest, to 340,907 (1985 census), 371,173 (1995) and an estimated 400,000 today.
(11,447 emigrants) and 1964 (8987) the rate of emigration attained 1 in 30 per year, which few countries have ever matched. Students of Maltese emigration have stressed both its demographic root-causes—overpopulation, spatial variations in population density and natural increase—and the economic drivers, namely, that emigration was highest when the Maltese economy and employment prospects were most stretched, especially in the light of the run-down of the British naval bases after Malta gained independence in 1964.36

Table 5 sets out key data on Maltese emigration and return migration over the period 1946–90. After the emigration boom of the 1950s and 1960s, emigration tailed off sharply after 1975. Return migration (for which the statistics are less secure) tipped the migratory balance in 1975 and continued at a high level into the 1980s. Since 1990 both emigration and return migration have been modest: throughout the decade 1991–2000 annual emigration averaged less than 100, whilst return averaged 615 per year.

Although irregular immigration has come to dominate the media and political debates in recent years, there are three earlier immigration trends which are worth noting: British settlers, Indian traders and Libyan teachers. The first of these still constitutes by far the most numerous immigrant community (though they are not generally viewed as immigrants but as settlers or ‘expats’); the latter two are statistically very minor but of some historical importance in that they have contributed in different ways to framing Maltese attitudes to ‘outsiders’.

British settlers have existed in Malta since the earliest colonial days, and there are a number of long-established Anglo-Maltese families. During the 1960s and 1970s their numbers were significantly boosted by the so-called ‘sixpenny settlers’, attracted to the islands by a low income tax of 6d. (six old pence) in the pound. In 1995, according to detailed research done on the British in Malta by Warnes and Patterson,37 they numbered 3741 on the Electoral Roll but around 5000 according to informal estimates of key persons in the community. The average age of this community, according to the Electoral Roll, was 53 years, since it included a high percentage of retired persons who had come to Malta via military, tourism or marriage links. The numbers of British settlers in Malta are now thought to be stable or diminishing, given the community’s age structure and the attraction of other competing locations for this kind of migration.

Second, the small but long-established Indian business community dates from the late 19th century. They are mostly shopkeepers and traders based in Valletta and have links to a wide trading diaspora in the Mediterranean and elsewhere who are Hindu Sindhis from the former north-west Indian province of Sind, which passed to Pakistan in the 1947 Partition. Traditionally they sold curios and luxury goods such as silks and ceramics. Now they have ‘followed the market’ and cater to both tourists and the Maltese, selling souvenirs, clothes and

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Most members of this community are well integrated and have Maltese citizenship; however, they remain a distinct group and are highly family-oriented, largely marrying within their diaspora, not with local people.

Thirdly, the ‘Libyan connection’ derived from the Mintoff era (1970s) when Malta’s radical prime minister Dom Mintoff diversified Malta’s diplomatic and trading links away from the British imperial connections to Libya, China and Eastern Europe. Arabic was made compulsory in secondary schools, taught by specially contracted Libyan teachers. Quite apart from the reluctance of many Maltese to learn Arabic, tensions arose because of this migration, stemming from the changed political landscape under Mintoff and the alleged criminal behaviour of some visiting Libyans in the 1980s.

These tensions have evidently shaped Maltese attitudes towards recent migrants, many of whom have ended up on the island with no legal status following a perilous journey by boat from Libya. Very few, though, are Libyan nationals. Most are from East Africa (Somalia, Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan) and have travelled through Libya with the aim of reaching Europe. Malta, unlike Italy, has been unable to negotiate a bilateral agreement with Libya to send migrants back there, whilst Malta often accuses Libya of turning a blind eye to irregular migration. At the same time, rumours persist in Malta that more than 1 million migrants are in Libya awaiting an opportunity to travel to Europe. This figure, although widely believed by the Maltese, is impossible to substantiate, but cuts to the heart of Maltese fears over the actual and potential scale of irregular migration. Whilst very few migrants setting off from Libya intend to come to Malta, since most know very little about the island, the country’s location directly between Libya and Italy (the preferred destination) means that boats carrying migrants either inadvertently arrive on the island or are intercepted by Maltese search and rescue patrols.

### Table 5. Maltese emigration and return migration, 1946–90, by five-year averages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Emigration annual average</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Return migration annual average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946–50</td>
<td>4141</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951–55</td>
<td>7605</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956–60</td>
<td>3607</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961–65</td>
<td>6175</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966–70</td>
<td>3329</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–75</td>
<td>3167</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>813</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976–80</td>
<td>1320</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981–85</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986–90</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


40 Malta’s coastal waters are quite expansive. There are also claims that Italy pre-empts migrants’ arrival on its own shores by signalling boats in distress to their Maltese counterparts.
number of irregular migrants highlight the scale of this migration, with well over 1000 arriving each year on the island, many of whom subsequently claim asylum. With a total population of around 400,000, alongside a population density 10 times that of other Southern European countries, these figures would (as Maltese politicians frequently assert) be the equivalent of over 100,000 migrants in larger European countries such as Italy or France. Since Malta’s entry into the EU in May 2004, the country has repeatedly highlighted the need to share what it considers a grossly unfair ‘burden’, but beyond aid from the European Refugee Fund and a handful of successfully resettled migrants from Malta to other EU countries (e.g. the Netherlands and Germany) as well as to North America, the island does appear rather isolated both politically and geographically on the EU’s southernmost external border.

This self-defined image of Malta as a small and vulnerable island has had several effects. Firstly, it has fuelled wider concerns about the impact of globalization on what remains a predominantly Catholic and conservative country. Irregular migration emerges as a convenient hook on which to hang fears about social change and the dilution of the Maltese identity, such as were heard in protests against irregular migration in the Maltese capital in October 2005. Secondly, these fears have gone some way to justify the policy of detaining all but the most vulnerable migrants for lengthy periods despite widespread condemnation from local and international bodies. Immigration is hence viewed as a problem and something to be limited. This has the effect of ignoring the contribution that is undoubtedly being made by migrants to Malta’s economy. Despite a lack of official statistics on the type and number of migrants working in Malta, there is anecdotal evidence that foreign workers are being employed in the construction and hotel industries in jobs that Maltese nationals are unwilling or unable to fill. This is also the case in Cyprus where official figures on migrant workers are much more readily available.

Cyprus

The history of Cypriot migration bears some obvious similarities with trends in Malta. As another strategically important island under British colonial rule (from 1878 to 1960), Cyprus was for several decades a source of emigrants living across the anglophone world in the UK, North America and Australia. Economic motives, such as persistent high unemployment in a largely rural economy, were the main push factor. Emigration levels were highest in the post-war years, peaking in 1960, but never reached the relative proportions of Malta’s ‘Great Exodus’.42 Whilst Cypriots moved in large numbers to Australia and England

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41See, for example, the most recent report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) which concluded that, despite improvements to relieve overcrowding in detention centres, sanitary conditions remained poor (a lack of hot water, and an inadequate number of toilets and showers). ECRI, ‘Follow-up report on Malta (2003–2005)’, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Strasbourg, 2006.

42Figures for Greek Cypriot emigration to Britain show a rise in numbers from just over 5000 in 1959 to nearly 13,000 the following year before falling again to just over 2100 in 1963. See R. King and J. Bridal, ‘The changing distribution of Cypriots in London’, Studi Emigrazione, 65, 1982, pp. 93–120, Table 1.
in the 1920s and 1930s, it is from the mid-1950s that mass migration occurred, in particular to England. Following the partition of Cyprus in 1974, a third wave of emigration took place, especially of refugees.

Migration trends in Cyprus, however, have not been wholly shaped by its former status as a British colony. Unlike Malta, Cyprus remains an ethnically divided island of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, a schism that has come to dominate the island’s politics over the past half century. Although this ethnic duality dates back to the 16th century when Cyprus, then part of the Ottoman empire, became home to some 40,000–60,000 Turks, it is only since intercommunal tensions broke out in the 1950s, and intensified into civil war in 1963, that the island moved towards the clear ethnic division between its Turkish north and Greek south that we recognize today. The 1960 Population Census shows how the island was still at that time more ethnically mixed: Turkish Cypriots, for example, were then found to be relatively more concentrated in the far west of the island at Paphos where they made up 31 per cent of the town’s population.43

The 1960 census was taken a few years before civil war broke out and caused many Turkish Cypriots to abandon their isolated villages for the safety of Turkish enclaves. Ethno-national tensions in Cyprus were fuelled by Turkish fears about Greek Cypriot hegemony on the island, and in particular about the prospect of enosis (or union) with Greece which many felt would threaten the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority. The revival of militant enosis in 1964, principally by the EOKA B terrorist organization, led Turkish Cypriots to withdraw from the Cypriot government, to refuse to pay taxes and to set up their own administrative cells. The famous ‘Green Line’ separating the two communities in the capital Nicosia dates from this period. Following a Greek-inspired coup in 1974 that briefly deposed the Cypriot president, Turkish forces invaded the island and brought about its partition. Massive internal displacement of the population ensued: an estimated 200,000 Greek Cypriots were forced to move southwards from northern Cyprus as refugees, 12,000 of whom would subsequently emigrate to London or to Greece.44 Figures on return migration are much less readily available, although it is generally believed that the economic boom of the late 1970s and 1980s in southern Cyprus has encouraged many Greek Cypriots to return.45

The economic fortunes in the Greek-controlled part of the island, in stark contrast to the much poorer north, are all the more remarkable if seen against the aftermath of the events in 1974. Partition entailed the loss of more than a third of the island for the Greek Cypriot government, including rich agricultural land, the main shipping port of Famagusta and Nicosia’s international airport. Unemployment amongst Greek Cypriots rose to nearly 30 per cent at the end of 1974, but then fell to just 2 per cent four years later thanks to the renewal of labour-intensive activities. Port facilities in the south were improved to compensate for the loss of Famagusta, airports were built at Larnaca and

43R. King, ‘Cyprus since 1974: economic and demographic change’, presentation to the Fifth Mediterranean Conference, Bar-Ilan University, Tel Aviv, 5–7 August 1980.
45G. Bertrand, ‘Cypriots in Britain: diaspora(s) committed to peace?’, *Turkish Studies*, 5(2), 2004, pp. 93–110.
Paphos and large-scale construction of hotels and other tourist facilities transformed the coastal landscape along stretches of southern Cyprus. Projects to irrigate land, most notably in the west around Paphos, boosted agriculture whilst exports grew rapidly in the late 1970s through increased trade with the Arab world.

Over the following decades the Cypriot service sector contributed a growing share of economic activity in the south (see Table 2). The tourist industry expanded to account for a fifth of Cyprus’ GDP at the turn of the century. Two and a half million tourists visited the island in 2000, up 30 per cent from 1995. British expats, attracted by the warm climate and low property prices as in Malta, arrived to seek out a new life abroad. In 2005, there were 5235 UK residents in Cyprus, more than a third of all EU nationals living there, whilst another third were from Greece.

Another effect of economic revival in southern Cyprus has been to attract foreign workers to the island. The segmented nature of the Cypriot labour market has resulted in a number of niches that are difficult to fill from the existing pool of local workers. Lack of requisite skills, or an unwillingness to work in often difficult and poorly remunerated jobs, have increased employer demand for overseas labour in a range of industries (construction and manufacturing) and services (hotels, restaurants and domestic work). Official recognition of Cyprus’ dualistic labour market first came in the form of policy changes in 1990 that relaxed immigration controls on foreign workers, and then, since Cyprus joined the EU, in granting all EU nationals (now including those from Romania and Bulgaria) unrestricted access.

This latter decision has effectively driven a further division between workers in the (Greek) Cypriot labour market. Whereas EU nationals are in principle allowed to become permanent residents, policy towards third-country nationals (TCNs) is formulated to ensure that their stay is short-term, temporary and restricted to specific sectors. In response to the EU directive stipulating that TCNs should be given the right to settle after five years of legal and continuous residence, Cyprus now only allows foreign workers to renew their work permits for up to four years instead of the previous six. The issue of migrants settling on the island is still filtered through the experience of post-1974 settlers in northern Cyprus from mainland Turkey, and more recently by media claims that permanently resident Pontian Greeks are to blame for rising crime rates and disrespecting local customs and traditions.

The immigration situation in Cyprus today is that EU nationals remain a minority of all foreign workers. Three-quarters of the 63,000 in 2006 were from countries outside the EU. More than a third were employed in private households as domestic workers, most of whom are from Sri Lanka and the Philippines. It is generally thought that these nationalities are favoured by their Cypriot employers for their ‘pliability’ within the household set-up. Suggestions that new EU nationals from Central and Eastern Europe could be employed

46. Trimikliniotis and C. Demetriou, Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Cyprus, Universität Oldenburg, Oldenburg, 2005.

as domestic workers have so far proved illusory as only a handful have found work in Cypriot households, as Table 6 shows. Women from these countries are seen as more assertive, and less likely to tolerate exploitative, and at times abusive, terms of employment. 48

Table 6, however, picks up some of the nascent trends in the employment of EU and third-country nationals. Immigrants from Poland and Slovakia are a growing presence in construction, manufacturing and hotel work where they are joining, and in some cases replacing, workers from outside the EU, mainly from Syria, Egypt and the Ukraine. Workers from Greece, however, remain a predominant feature of the workforce in these three industries in Cyprus, reflecting the long-established ties between the two countries. Jobs in restaurants have also attracted a number of Polish and Slovakian nationals, although the majority of employees are still recruited from outside the EU, notably from Russia and the Ukraine. It should be noted, though, that around a quarter of restaurant workers are designated as ‘performing artists’, which in many cases is just an official term for sex work in cabarets and bars. 49

Whilst little research has been conducted on irregular migration to Cyprus, the issue has figured highly on the political agenda in recent years. Official estimates that up to 90 per cent of irregular migrants arrive in the Greek-controlled area from northern Cyprus have hit the headlines since the opening up of the partition line in April 2003. Greek Cypriot authorities suggest that migrants transit through mainland Turkey before taking advantage of lax immigration controls in northern Cyprus to make their way southwards. This situation is complicated by the fact that Cyprus’ internal border, brought about by Turkish action in 1974, was effective in preventing most irregular migration prior to 2003. The opening up of the border, whilst welcomed by most Greek Cypriots, has left southern Cyprus vulnerable to irregular migration from the north where it has no jurisdiction. On the other hand, this emphasis on irregular flows from the north does have a political edge. It detracts attention away from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic activity</th>
<th>Third-country nationals</th>
<th>EU citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, hunting and forestry</td>
<td>3919</td>
<td>3743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>3897</td>
<td>3497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
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<td>3491</td>
</tr>
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<td>2752</td>
<td>2095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>5662</td>
<td>5713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private households with employed persons</td>
<td>15,736</td>
<td>16,498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Section, Social Insurance Services, Nicosia.

the effect of denying permanent residence to TCNs who then overstay their visas, thus adding to the number of undocumented migrants on the island. Furthermore, the policy of tying immigrant visas to the one employer also means that a foreign worker who loses their job also loses their residence status in Cyprus.

There has also been a dramatic rise in the number of asylum-seekers, from 582 applying in 2000 to some 12,000 in 2005. There appear to be two reasons behind this: first, the opening up of the partition line as described above; and second, the decision of the Greek Cypriot government not to renew the visas of some non-EU nationals following accession to the EU, which led to many asylum claims by people not in need of protection. One notable example of this was the rise in claims by Bangladeshi and Pakistani students who had been advised to claim asylum as a way to obtain a work permit. In fact, asylum-seekers in Cyprus are only allowed to work in farming and agriculture. Many did so after having initially been duped by their agents into believing that they could work, and send money home, whilst studying. Some students had also fallen foul of agents who had promised, but failed, to pay their private college fees in Cyprus.

The asylum issue came to a head in May 2006 when demonstrations by migrants and NGOs in Nicosia highlighted the lack of structures to deal effectively with the scale of asylum claims. More specific concerns focused on the detention of some asylum-seekers in prison cells, arbitrary restrictions on making asylum claims, the lack of effective legal aid, and the discriminatory and racist attitudes of the police, immigration authorities, politicians and the mass media. These concerns are in many ways emblematic of the wider context in which migrants find themselves in Cyprus. Whilst Cyprus has implemented EU-wide directives to combat discrimination, many migrants remain unaware of their rights in the workplace due to a lack of information and support available to them. This is particularly the case for domestic workers and 'performing artists', although the Interior Ministry has recently published leaflets to inform women working in bars and cabarets of their rights. Racism, particularly against people with darker skin, remains prevalent and represents another barrier to migrants' integration.

Conclusion

At this point, we return to the six key questions posed earlier and, drawing on the evidence of the migration situations in each of the three countries which we have just reviewed, attempt to draw some conclusions about the extent to which the countries 'fit' the Southern European model. Of course, the answers are not identical for all three countries.

A preliminary point concerns geographical and demographic scale. All three countries are small in population and territorial terms, compared to nearly all other EU countries. Amongst 'old' EU states, only Luxembourg, with a population the same size as Malta's, is equally small, although Estonia (1.5 million) and Latvia (2.3 million) are on a par with Slovenia (Table 1). In one sense small states are

52 N. Trimikliniotis, op. cit.
well-placed to integrate into the EU: by virtue of their small size they have historically been compelled to be outward-looking, multilingual, open to movement and exchange. From an EU perspective, small countries are easily ‘digested’, posing far less of a demographic, economic or cultural ‘threat’ than, say, Turkey. At the same time, smallness brings vulnerability—limited domestic markets for industrial production, lack of economies of scale across the private and public sectors, and structural imbalances in the labour market. This latter defect may prompt a brain drain as highly trained people may only be able to realize their ambitions in the wider sphere of the EU free-movement labour market.

Second preliminary point: geography underpins many key issues for the three countries. All lie in the outer margins of Schengenland, but each is positioned in a different way. Slovenia, once part of the borderless Yugoslavia, now has the EU fortress-frontier between itself and Croatia—a border that was previously crossed scarcely without notice by thousands of local people, migrants and travellers. At the same time, within the wider European space, Slovenia has a very favourable geo-strategic position astride major corridors of transport and economic activity linking both north–south (Berlin–Prague–Vienna–Venice) and east–west (Milan–Trieste–Budapest–Bucharest). At the same time, its location makes it the entry-point for migrants from the Eurasian region and it is estimated that in the future at least one-third of all migrants from Eastern Europe and Asia will stop at its door.\cite{53} Malta and Cyprus, as islands, and therefore the geographical antithesis to near-landlocked Slovenia, function in a different strategic and migratory space, as maritime stepping-stones. Malta is an obvious bridge between Africa and Europe—a role it has often played throughout its history. Together with the nearby Italian island of Lampedusa, it offers the first footfall for boat-borne migrants crossing from the central North African coast. Cyprus is more remote geographically, an eastern outpost of the EU, tucked up under the coast of Turkey, on the doorstep of the unstable Middle East. It gathers migrants seeking refuge from this troubled region, but also coming from further afield.

Coming now to the six questions, the first asks whether Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus have followed the same historical pattern of emigration followed by immigration, switching in the 1970s, as the main protagonist countries of the South European model. The answer is resoundingly positive. Well before accession in 2004, the three countries had become targets for immigration from Africa, Asia and elsewhere; now such pressures are intensifying and this can be expected to continue, further transforming the societies of these small countries. However, there are some variations in the timing and nature of the migration turnaround, although available statistics are not very clear on this; rather it is a matter of knowledge ‘on the ground’. In Slovenia the switch from emigration up to the 1970s to immigration subsequently is complicated by the fact that most of the immigration was internal within the ‘old’ Yugoslavia. This migration source continues: during the late 1990s and early 2000s, 69 per cent of total immigration was from the ex-Yugoslav territories, and nearly all the remainder was from other European countries, including Austria and Italy on the one hand, and Albania, Russia and the Ukraine on the other.\cite{54} Hence although Slovenia

\footnotetext{53}{B. Kovač, op. cit., pp. 215, 245.}
\footnotetext{54}{Calculated from S. Zavratnik Zimic, op. cit., p. 15, Table 3.}
follows the numerical trend, the main source countries are different from those found in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal.

Turning to Malta, whilst the statistical trend is the same—switching from net emigration to net immigration in the 1970s—the sources of the inflow are, on the one hand, returning Maltese emigrants, and on the other, predominantly British settlers. Only in very recent years has the number of immigrants from other, less wealthy, countries become significant, including asylum-seekers and illegal arrivals by boat.

For Cyprus, the situation is complicated by the division of the island in 1974, which prompted a fresh wave of emigration. This element apart, the general pattern does indeed conform to the model. Hence we find large-scale emigration during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, substantial return migration overlapping and succeeding these migration decades, settlement of British expats, and, more recently, immigrants from a variety of Asian, Middle Eastern, East European and African countries.

Much of what is said immediately above, and in the more detailed accounts of each country’s immigrant profiles, gives us answers to the second question, about nationalities, and whether there is correspondence to the Italian submodel (great diversity) or the Greek one (a dominant immigrant nationality). Here the issue of scale becomes relevant once again, since a high number of immigrant nationalities is clearly more likely in a large receiving country as opposed to a very small one. Cyprus comes closest of the three to the ‘diverse’ model. Slovenia, with its heavy reliance on ex-Yugoslav nationals, is closer to the Greek model—indeed both have around two-thirds of their immigrants from one source. Malta, like Cyprus, has a surprising diversity of immigrant nationalities for its size, but the relative statistical weight of British settlers is greater here than in Cyprus.

Thirdly, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus clearly exemplify the general South European characteristic of a high level of clandestine and ‘illegal’ migrant flows: indeed these are the dominant means of arrival in all three countries. All three are grappling with the challenge of asylum claims, with low rates of acceptance—again conforming to the record of the longer-standing Southern EU countries which have pitifully small numbers of accepted refugees compared to Northern EU states like Sweden and the Netherlands. However, unlike the Southern European countries, with their periodic ‘amnesties’ and regularizations of undocumented migrants, the three countries under study have not yet adopted this pragmatic strategy—probably for fear of setting a precedent and stimulating more irregular migration.

Persisting undocumented status, and other ambiguous status arrangements, help to explain the emergence, in all three countries, of a dualistic labour market, with immigrants carrying out jobs that the rather small and rigid local labour supply is unable or unwilling to perform. This is the fourth question in our list. Migrant workers are available, or are brought in, to plug specific gaps in the lower end of the employment hierarchy, doing mainly temporary and seasonal jobs in construction, agriculture (but not in Malta) and tourism. Only in Cyprus do we see the marked development of female domestic labour migration, although in all three countries there is small-scale evidence for women migrants entering (sometimes under trafficking arrangements) as ‘entertainers’, ‘hostesses’, etc.—often euphemisms for involvement in sex work. As elsewhere
in Southern Europe, women from poor Asian and East European countries are most likely to be engaged in these activities. This provides some evidence for gender-specific flows (the fifth question), although the scale and clear demonstration of this are limited by lack of data and the small scale of the different national groups under observation.

Our sixth and final question was a broader one to do with migration and integration policy (or the lack of it) and the particular social model of migration that countries adhere to. All three countries’ legislation is reactive rather than carefully planned, and in this it follows the general Southern European model of creating policy ad hoc, with no clear theory of the role migrants should play in the host society. The emphasis is on border control, visas and deportation, rather than on regularization of migrants, let alone measures for their integration. In all three countries there is criticism of the ways in which irregular migrants and asylum-seekers are detained in prisons or prison-like camps and centres, falling short of European standards for the reception of migrants. Both island-states are faced with an unreasonable level of responsibility over the external borders of the EU; neither appears to have adequate resources to do so. Slovenia, on the other hand, has managed to reduce the migratory crossings along its southern border with Croatia.

The de facto multiculturalism of (often) undocumented migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, on the one hand, clashes with the ethnic fundamentalism of small, young states on the other. An essentialized but poorly defined Slovenianness has emerged in the wake of the ethnicized break-up of Yugoslavia. The essence of ‘being Maltese’, for a small and homogenous population on a small island, has been tested by the rather sudden arrival of immigrants and asylum-seekers literally over the horizon. Cyprus, too, has been confronted by new challenges to its traditional self-definition as a Greek-dominated but acknowledgedly bi-cultural, bilingual and two-faith ‘nation’; here an interesting dynamic is unfolding between the inflow and settlement of new immigrants and the opening up of relations between the two sides of the island which had been hermetically sealed from each other for 30 years.

Immigration exposes the vulnerability of these three small countries to intensified global mobility. All three are both countries of transit migration (especially Slovenia, en route to Italy, Austria and Germany, but also Malta, to Italy, and Cyprus to Greece) and destinations in their own right (less so Malta, however). Their small size makes it difficult for them to absorb significant numbers of migrants and refugees without a self-perceived threat (which is also real, to some extent) to their ethno-national identity, which itself is relatively new, emerging from the former Yugoslavia on the one hand, or a history of British colonialism on the other, and now is being re-made again under the aegis of an enhanced European vocation as EU members.

Geography is once again important. Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus are the EU’s new borderland sites and spaces: the links are both to migration flows and to geopolitics. All are located at points of great geo-strategic sensitivity: Slovenia on the edge of the Balkans, Malta facing Libya, Cyprus on the doorstep of the Middle East. Malta joins nearby Lampedusa and the Canary Islands as island pressure-points for opportunistic access-routes by African migrants eager to enter Europe. Cyprus struggles with the phenomenon of irregular migration within the politically sensitive issue of the ‘Cyprus problem’ and the border
between the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus, part of the EU, and the (Turkish) Republic of North Cyprus. For the time being, so long as North Cyprus is not part of the EU, this newly opened border is now an EU frontier. Slovenia, meanwhile, is now viewed by the EU and the ‘West’ as part of an ‘arc of stability’ of mainly newly acceded countries (Slovenia–Hungary–Romania–Bulgaria–Greece) surrounding the countries of the Western Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania) which are economically poorer and politically immature, still the destination of international security forces and humanitarian assistance, not (yet) ready to join the EU.55

We conclude that Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus do, on the whole, conform to the Southern European model of immigration, but with their own individual departures from this model. Cyprus is closest; this reflects its buoyant ‘Mediterranean’ economy based on intensive farming, tourism, construction and services. Hence its migrant stock possesses many of the characteristics—diversity of migrant nationalities, multiple and gendered labour-market niches, etc.—of larger Southern EU countries. Slovenia conforms least, because of its more restricted ‘migration field’ and its history and geography as part of the Yugoslav–Balkan region. Malta lies in between: similar to Cyprus in its overall migration dynamics in many respects, but unable to absorb large numbers of migrants because of the economic and resource limitations which derive from its nature as a small and very densely populated island.

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55Although it is acknowledged that the remaining countries of the former Yugoslavia, and even Albania, do have the ultimate vocation to become EU members, but only after adopting ‘appropriate’ policy behaviour, including establishing ‘normal’ relationships between themselves, and thereby ‘European’ values and standards of living are achieved. See E. Kavalski, ‘From the crescent to the circle of security? Defining the Euro-Atlantic border in the Balkans’, in D. Nečak (ed.), Borders in Southeastern Europe: Culture and Politics between the 18th and 21st Century, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana (Historia, Vol. 7), 2004, pp. 87–100.